Abstract. We define a new primitive, input-aware equivocable commitment, baring similar hardness assumptions as plaintext-aware encryption and featuring equivocability. We construct an actual input-aware equivocable commitment protocol, based on a flavor of Diffie-Hellman assumptions allowing adversarially chosen domain parameters. On a parallel front, and since our commitment is extractable and equivocable in a straight-line way, we show that our commitment enjoys UC-security, when atomic exchanges are available as a UC setup. We further compare our protocol and our UC setup with similar, existing ones (i.e., in terms of efficiency, assumptions needed, etc.). Finally, we show that cryptography becomes UC-realizable in a natural way when participants are able to have "close encounters" or when atomic exchanges can be enforced onto the communication.
whilst commitment in itself is not an issue anymore (i.e., the relay is prevented), Kalai's et al. [22] state that their model has the drawback of not being usable with protocols that employ time themselves (e.g., distance-bounding protocols [6] ). But this may be unfortunate: as we will see further (i.e., in Section 3.2), timesensitive protocols can in fact be themselves tightly linked to UC-secure protocols and their realization.
Our Justification for UC Hybrid Models with Atomic Exchanges. Summing up the above paragraphs, we can see that the -isolated parties of Damgård's et al. [15] can clearly be viewed as a restriction of the UC communication, as much as Kalai's et al. [22] model can. Thus, the former can also prevent relay attacks; moreover, -isolated parties do allow (and, in fact, facilitate) the composition of/with protocols that involve time themselves. And, as we envisage the usage of timed protocols (e.g., distance-bounding protocols [6] ), thus setting à la Kalai with delayed messages would be difficult to handle in our context. So, we embark on the approach of using UC setups, rather than augmentation of models with time/delays. In order to realize UC (multiple) commitments (and thus all multi-party computation as per [11] ), we will invoke a UC-setup similar to the recent -isolated parties of Damgård's et al. To this end, we put forward a UC setup called F atomic . By atomic exchanges we mean the communication between protocol parties produced via their interaction with F atomic .
Our functionality F atomic is similar to the " -isolated parties" setup of Damgård et al. [15] . The intuition behind is that the F atomic functionality allows two parties to have an elementary, "fully isolated" exchange of just one message each. This can be viewed as a specialization of the F -isolated functionality of Damgård's et al. [15] (namely, with = 0 and an exchanges limited to two messages in "one-round"). On the one hand, it is not clear how to realize F 0-isolate using F atomic . Intuitively, we need several instances of F atomic and it would mean to pass information from one to the other using non-malleable encryption. So, F atomic may be weaker than F 0-isolate . On the other hand, F atomic may be simpler to implement. For instance, the responder may be subject to several constraints such as time-bound to respond (like in NFC tags in distance-bounding [6] ), or may be in a tamper proof token (such as the one by Katz [23] ), or may result from a "close encounter".
Extrapolating PAW. In parallel, in this paper, we will define input-aware equivocable commitments (outside the UC model), a scheme akin in its characteristics to plaintext-aware encryption [14, 21, 31] . Our definition also includes equivocability, which is crucial for UC-security. We propose a specific protocol that implements this scheme under special types Diffie-Hellman assumptions. I.e., one such assumption is an extension of the DH regular knowledge assumption to be required to hold in any group [17] . In our case, the DH knowledge assumption needed is supposed to hold further in any adversarially chosen group (which is a weaker assumption than assuming it holds in any group). Also, in our UC setting, such a scheme can be employed in, e.g., concurrent RFID/NFC-based contactless payment protocols [25] where some computation is to be done atomically (i.e., by the RFID/NFC tag alone) and the final result needs to be "independent" for other simultaneous such computations.
UC Commitments and Their Assumptions. UC multiple commitments are possible under the different UC-setups. A short list of such setups is as follows: 1. Katz's tamper-resistant hardware tokens [23] (where under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption and a static adversarial model); 2. similar tokens to Katz's but susceptible to more powerful attacks [12] ; 3. hardware tokens similar to those in [23] , but used in an asymmetric fashion to minimize the computational assumptions [28] ; 4. the more recent [15] relaxation of the tamper-resistant hardware tokens to a functionality modelling the partial isolation and limited communication power of a party (under the assumptions of one-way permutations and dense public key, IND-CPA secure encryption schemes with pseudorandom ciphertexts, but the adversarial model is strong (i.e., active and adaptive).
There are some UC lines [10, 16] in which the ideas underlying the idealworld simulation of (multiple) commitment can be loosely linked to the one that we are going to put forward. Firstly, in [10] , Canetti et al. achieve a F MCOMrealization with non-erasing parties, in the CRS-hybrid model using an encryption scheme obviously samplable [14] . In this case, the trick that allows I to run its simulations (i.e., that gives I the oblivious-sampling coins for its ciphertext) is to sample ciphertexts without running the encryption algorithm. Note that an encryption obviously samplable (with respect to chosen-ciphertext attacks) [14] is possible under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. Similarly, our protocol is possible if some special Diffie-Hellman assumptions are used.
Using several instances of F COM , ZK is UC-realized in the F COM -hybrid model [10] by mainstream ideas: by repeating t times, in parallel, Blum's protocol for Hamiltonian-Cycles (HC) [4] , where the commitments of the provers are calls to F COM . Damgård and Nielsen [16] construct ZK more efficiently, but in a similar way, using the SAT protocol which proves satisfiability of boolean circuits. Along similar lines, our one-bit commitment can be used to F atomic -UC realize ZK in the same complexity as the Canetti's et al. [10] . In Appendix A we included a discussion about some further, "unconventional" commitments.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we introduce the notion of input-aware equivocable commitment, i.e., commitments that include both extractability and equivocability. We further propose some extensions of the Diffie-Hellman hardness assumptions or of the discrete logarithm hardness assumption, for the case where the adversary can maliciously select the group structure. We call it an adversarially-chosen group extension of the DH assumption. We propose the F atomic functionality as a new setup assumption. This is a new, easy to implement UC setup, drawing upon un-aided local computation. Finally, we propose an input-aware equivocable commitment in the plain model, which we then prove to UC-realize F COM in presence of the F atomic setup.
Input-Aware Commitments in Classical Cryptography
In this section, we formalize the notion of input-aware equivocable commitments and present one protocol. On our way to doing so, we specify different flavors of Diffie-Hellman (DH) assumptions.
Commitment Scheme
The following definition reiterates the usual meaning of a commitment scheme in conformity with traditional (i.e., non-composable) cryptography.
Definition 1 (Commitment Scheme).
A bit-commitment scheme in terms of a security parameter λ is a pair of polynomially bounded protocols ((S COM , R COM ), (S OPEN , R OPEN )) where S COM has an input bit b, and R OPEN has an output bitb. The protocols may abort. The
execution 1 is called the commitment phase. For simplicity, 1 λ is omitted from the notation. Let View S , respectively View R , denote the view of S COM , respectively the view of R COM . The
execution is called the opening phase. It produces the final output from R, i.e.,b. A commitment scheme is expected to be correct: i.e., when correctly executed, no protocol aborts andb = b.
The following definition completes the above by formalizing the usual requirements of a commitment scheme in conformity with traditional (i.e., noncomposable) cryptography.
Definition 2 (The Hiding Property).
A commitment scheme is said to be hiding if the following holds. For any polynomially bounded R * COM , if S COM (b; r S ) ↔ R * COM (r R ) ends up with the final view View R for R * COM , then View R |b = 0 and View R |b = 1 are computationally indistinguishable.
In the above, View R |b = x (with x ∈ {0, 1}) denotes the marginal distribution (over all random coins and inputs) of View R as a random variable, conditioned to the event b = x. Note that we can assume without loss of generality that R * COM is deterministic (since r R could be hard-coded in it).
Definition 3 (The Binding Property). A commitment scheme is said to be binding if the following holds. For any polynomially bounded S * COM and S * OPEN , if the S * COM (r S ) ↔ R COM (r R ) and then the S *
, where this probability is taken in the random choices of S * OPEN and R OPEN .
This means that once the commitment is made (i.e., r S and r R are fixed), S * OPEN cannot open to bothb = 0 andb = 1. We recall that f (λ) = negl(λ) means that for all c > 0, we have f (λ) = O(λ −c ).
Diffie-Hellman Assumptions
In this subsection, we specify several Diffie-Hellman assumptions.
Definition 4 (DH Key Generator).
A DH key is a tuple K = (G, q, g) such that G is a group, q is a prime dividing the order of G, g is an element of G of order q. A DH key-generator is a ppt. algorithm Gen producing DH keys K such that |K| = Poly(log q) and the operations (i.e., multiplication, comparison, and membership checking in the group g generated by g) over their domain can be computed in time Poly(log q). We say that (S, S ) is a valid K-DH pair for g σ if S ∈ g and S = S σ , where σ ∈ Z q . Given K = (G, q, g), we define a function DH K with a variable number of inputs from G by DH K (g x 1 , . . . , g x n ) = g x 1 ···x n .
An example of a DH key is (Z * p , q, g) where p and q are primes and p = 2q + 1, g ∈ QR(p), g = 1.
We now strengthen the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. Below, we use an arbitrary ppt. algorithm B generating some coins ρ and a state state.
Such coins ρ and/or state state will be sometimes used as auxiliary inputs to some ITMs in the security games formalized below.
Definition 5 (DDH Asmpt. in an Adversarially-Chosen Group (ag-DDH Gen )).
The ag-DDH Gen assumption over a domain of DH keys K states that for any ppt. algorithms A and B in the next game,
The probability stands over the random coins r B , r, b ∈ U {0, 1} and α, β, γ ∈ U Z q and is negligible in terms of log q. A (and B) run in ppt. in terms of log q.
It should be clear that ag-CDH Gen , the computational version of this problem can be defined as well.
Gen assumption over a domain of DH keys K states that for any ppt. algorithms A and B in the next game, the probability that
and that S i = 1 for i = 1, . . . , n is negligible:
The probability stands over the random coins r B , r, and α, β ∈ U Z q . The probability is negligible in terms of log q. A (and B) run in ppt. in terms of log q.
The standard Diffie-Hellman computational problem corresponds to the CDH 0 problem. Clearly, the CDH n assumption implies the CDH n−1 assumption for all n > 0, but the opposite implication is an open problem. In what follows, we will use the CDH 1 assumption. We now similarly strengthen the Diffie-Hellman knowledge (DHK0) assumption (for a summary the latter, refer to [17] ).
Definition 7 (DHK0 Asmpt. in an Adversarially-Chosen Group (ag-DHK0 Gen )).
The ag-DHK0 Gen assumption over a domain of DH keys K states that for any ppt. algorithm A and B in the next game, there is a polynomially bounded algorithm E such that the probability of the below experiment outputting 1 is negligible:
is not a valid K-DH pair for g σ , then return 0 7: s := E(1 λ , state, g σ , r) 8: if S = g s , then return 0 9: return 1 The probability stands over the random coins r B , r and σ ∈ U Z q and is negligible in terms of log q. The running time of E (and B) is ppt. in terms of log q.
This assumption means that whatever the algorithm producing valid DH pairs for a random g σ with σ unknown, this algorithm must know the discrete logarithm of their components except for some negligible cases.
The algorithm B used in the games above is denoted as the biotope algorithm.
What distinguishes these assumptions from the mainstream DDH and DHK0 assumptions [17] is that these should hold for all K selected by a ppt. biotope algorithm (even by a malicious one) and not only for some K which is randomly selected by an honest participant. In fact, when selecting a DH key without a CRS in a two party protocol, the above assumption must hold for any maliciously selected K (since we ignore a priori which party is honest). Hence, the name we use: DH assumptions in an adversarially-chosen group. As we mentioned in the introduction, the latter assumption is a special case of the DH knowledge assumption required to hold in any group, or, equivalently, for any B and r B .
Such assumptions were originally introduced by Dent in [17] . Here, we do not require the assumption to hold in any group, but rather in those groups G for which we can produce a seed for Gen to use in generating G, or equivalently, for any, B on average over r B .
In the next, for readability purposes, we will omit the additional-input 1 λ from the inputs of the machines that take it, its presence being implicit.
Input-Aware Equivocable Bit-Commitment
Definition 8 (Input-Aware Equivocable Commitment Scheme). An input-aware equivocable bit-commitment (IAEC) scheme is a commitment scheme ((S COM , R COM ), (S OPEN , R OPEN )) as per Def. 1, with the following additional properties. Let b denote the input of S COM ,b be the output of R OPEN or R * OPEN , and View S , respectively View R , be the view of S COM or S * COM and, respectively, of R COM or R * COM in the commitment phase. -(sender input-awareness aka extractability) For any polynomially bounded algorithms S * COM and S * OPEN , there is a polynomially bounded algorithm Extract such that the following holds. When running the commitment phase
followed by the opening phase S * OPEN (View S ; r S ) ↔ R OPEN (View R ; r R ), the next holds with probability 1−negl(λ), taken over the random r S , r S , r R , r R : -b = Extract(View S ) and no protocol aborts, -or Extract(View S ) aborts and the commitment phase as well, -or the opening phase aborts.
-(receiver self-equivocability) For any polynomially bounded algorithm R * COM and R * OPEN , there is a polynomially bounded algorithm Equiv such that the following holds. When running the commitment phase
followed by the flipping a coin b to run the opening phase
it all results in a final view View R of R * OPEN and this is such that View R |b = 0 and View R |b = 1 are computationally indistinguishable over the random r S , r R , r R , r S and b .
The above definition implies the classical notions of security (i.e., notions of hiding and binding commitments as per Defs. 2, 3). Equivocability already says that View R |b = 0 and View R |b = 1 are indistinguishable since View R is included in View R ; so the commitment is hiding. Furthermore, a malicious sender who could open a commitment to both b = 0 and b = 1 with a probability which is negligible would contradictb = Extract(View S ); so, the commitment is binding.
We will now construct an IAEC based on the ag-DHK0 Gen , the ag-DDH Gen and the ag-CDH 1 Gen assumptions. We denote it as protocol Π Gen (see Fig. 1 ). As per Section 3.2, the label "atomic" in Fig. 1 , applies only in the context of the use of a UC functionality for atomic exchanges when building the protocol to be UC-secure. It shall be ignored in the current section.
Protocol Π Gen The commitment phase (i.e., to be described by the S COM and R COM protocols) works as follows.
1. S generates ρ for Gen, i.e., it does K := Gen(ρ), and S sends ρ to R. 2. Then, R also computed K := Gen(ρ) and R selects 2 some α ∈ Z * q and sends X 0 := g α to S. 3. S verifies 3 that X 0 ∈ g , selects x ∈ Z * q , calculates X := g x and X := X x 0 , and sends X, X to R. S picks β ∈ Z * q and calculates Y 0 := g β . S sends Y 0 to R. further selects r ∈ Z q and sends U := g r , V := Z b X r and β to R, where b is the bit that S is in the process of committing to. 6. R verifies that U,V ∈ g and that Y 0 = g β .
The opening phase (i.e., to be described by the S OPEN and R OPEN protocols) works as follows. g z b ) y is equal to the "public" W 1 γ ). The trick is that keys X and Y are declared in such a way that the DHK0 assumption would make the corresponding secret-keys x and y extractable by using input-aware equivocable techniques when given the appropriate coins. Indeed, x would allow to extract b from the commitment and y would allow to equivocate.
Theorem 9.
Under the ag-CDH 1 Gen , DDH Gen , and ag-DHK0 Gen assumptions, the protocol Π Gen above is an input-aware equivocable bit-commitment.
Proof (space-constrained sketch). Since the polynomial-time bound and the correctness are trivial, we only have to construct Extract and Equiv.
Sender Input-Awareness. Let S * COM and S * OPEN be some malicious commitment and opening algorithms, respectively. We define two algorithms A and B as follows. The algorithm B simulates the experiment S * COM (r S ) ↔ R COM (r R ) up to the moment before S * COM receives X 0 , when B stops. Then, as per dictated by the ag-DHK0 Gen game, B sets ρ and state according to the experiment he just took part in. That is ρ would be as generated in S * COM (r S ) ↔ R COM (r r ) and state would be the current view of S * COM with its coins limited to its run so far, i.e., limited to a prefix r s of the whole set of coins r s (r s := r s ||r s ). Then the output (X, X ) of S * COM with input state, augmented with the message X 0 and the coins r s defines A(state,X 0 ; r s ). By the ag-DHK0 Gen assumption, there must exist some algorithm E(state,X 0 ; r s ) such that -except for negligible cases-E(state,X 0 ; r s ) outputs x satisfying that X = g x , or R COM rejects (X, X ). Now, let r s = r s ||r s be the coins in View S and state, X 0 , Z 0 , Z 1 as above be in View S . We now define Extract(View S ) as follows. Let ρ := S * COM (r S ) and (X, X ) := S * COM (X 0 ; r S ). Except in negligible cases, x = E(1 λ , state, X 0 ; r S ) is such that X = g x . If (U,V ) is valid, Extract can compute Z = VU −x and compare Z to Z 0 and to Z 1 . If there is no match, then we return ⊥. Otherwise, we return b as per the match Z b = Z. Note that Pr[Z 0 = Z 1 ] is negligible, so there is a unique match. Now, we need to show the soundness of this procedure, i.e., S * OPEN cannot open to something different from b = Extract(View S ). For this, we show that S * COM and S * OPEN could define an adversary for ag-CDH Gen . We will use a rewinding technique to define this adversary. (Note that extraction is straight-line. It is only the adversary showing that extraction is sound which is using rewinding.)
To define the adversary (using the created ρ) receiving A and B from outside, we first simulate the experiment until we get β. Then, we rewind it but inject Y = A instead of some Y with a known discrete logarithm. We can also compute Y = Y β thanks to getting β. Similarly, we flip a coinb and inject Zb = g zb with zb random and Z 1−b = B. Clearly, β is bound to be unchanged. Since View S has a correct distribution, we can still run b = Extract(View S ) and x = E(1 λ , state, X 0 , r S ). If b =b, this is bad luck and we restart. Since S * COM sees no information aboutb, bad luck happens with probability 1 2 and we do not have to restart too much until we are in the lucky b =b case.
Then, the adversary continues to simulate the opening. If b = b, the adversary aborts. Otherwise, the adversary must simulate some genuine (U ,V ). We know that V = g z b U x . The regular receiver would send a random U = U y g s and some V = Y y X s connected to U with the relation V = Y z b (U ) x . So, the simulator could just pick U at random and compute V = Y z b (U ) x since he knows z b = zb and x. He then obtains from S * OPEN some (W,W ). With a genuine receiver sending s, we obtain γ such that
So, to make the receiver accept, the (W,W ) pair we must satisfy DH(A, B,W ) = W even before providing s. Due to the ag-CDH 1 Gen assumption, this happens with negligible probability. So, in the genuine experiment, either the experiment aborts, or b = Extract(View S ), or W = DH K (Y, Z 1−b ,W ), thus making R OPEN aborts.
Receiver Self-Equivocability. Let R * COM and R * OPEN be some malicious commitment and opening algorithms. We define two algorithms A and B as follows. The algorithm B simulates the experiment S COM (r S ) ↔ R * COM (r R ) until the moment before R * COM receives Y 0 and then B stops. As before, B will produce his needed ρ as in the experiment S COM (r S ) ↔ R * COM (r R ) and state as the current view of R * COM , limiting his coins r R to r R , i.e., to those used so far, where r R := r R ||r R . Then the output (Y,Y ) of R * COM with input state, augmented with the message Y 0 and the coins r R defines A(state,Y 0 ; r R ). Due to the ag-DHK0 Gen assumption, there must exist some algorithm E such that, except for negligible cases, E(state,Y 0 ; r R ) produces y satisfying Y = g y , or S COM rejects (Y,Y ).
We define all messages as in the S COM (b; r S ) ↔ R * COM (r R ) experiment from the view View S . Note that running S COM (b; r S ) also defines ρ.
We define Equiv(b , View R ; r S ) by sending out b , receiving U ,V , computing The view of R includes ρ, X, X , Y 0 , U,V, β, b , W,W , γ. In all cases, W,W , γ can be simulated by R with the same distribution, as well as Y 0 , β. Since α is produced by R, X can be simulated as well. Finally, the view reduces to (ρ, X,U,V, b ). Indeed, distinguishing b = 0 from b = 1 with b random reduces to the semantic security of the ElGamal cryptosystem. As proven in [5] , this reduces to the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem.
3 UC-Secure (Input-Aware Equivocable) Commitment with a "Mild" Setup
In Subsection 3.1, we introduce the UC functionality called F atomic , which is needed as UC setup for the UC-realization of our (IAEC) commitment. The actual UC-realization of commitment is shown in Subsection 3.2; some discussions about this realization and its relationships with existing lines of UC-realization of commitment are also included.
UC Setup Functionality for Atomic Exchanges
We will now present a UC functionality that models one exchange of messages between two parties, one of which is in complete isolation; hence, the name atomic exchange. The restriction to one exchange makes this functionality a specialization of the F −isolate of Damgård's et al. [15] . Also, differently from [15] , the functionality below draws strictly upon the user on which the limited communication is enforced; in that sense, in the functionality below, this user can update its algorithm sent to the functionality several times before the actual computation is made.
The F atomic Functionality of Atomic Exchanges. Let poly be a polynomial.
Assume two parties A and B that would like to have an atomic exchange, i.e., A would normally send m to B and, without outside help, B would have to respond with m . Mainly, this lack of outside help and the one exchange are the core of the F atomic functionality. Again, this functionality models the fact that B does not communicate with another participant in between receiving m and producing his response m , that before "being asked" to compute m in isolation the participant can update his machine and that this computation/communication is supposed to capture one exchange only. As we said in the introduction and in the related-work, this functionality is a specialization of the F −isolated in [15] , where = 0, the exchange is reduced to one message per each of the two parties involved and where the machine of the "computing-party" can be updated before the need for the computation is imminent. In that sense, one cannot say clearly if our functionality is weaker or stronger than the F −isolated functionality in [15] .
Request for
Further, we note that this sort of setup is sufficient for bypassing a relay attack of the sort that lead to the impossibility of UC-commitments in the plain model. In the same time, especially for the cases where only two parties are involved (e.g., the aforementioned mutually independent commitments [24] ), this sort of setup is suitable to bypass the known malleability problems.
In practice, a possible way to implement such an atomic-exchange functionality is given by distance-bounding protocols [6] . This is one of the actual methods implemented to prevent relay attacks [18] . Namely, to achieve the atomic-exchange, the two concerned parties can use -in an initial/certain part of the communication-a distance-bounding protocol (or a slight modification of such a protocol, which still considers the time-of-flight of the messages in accepting/rejecting them). I.e., the correct answer could have been produced only and solely by the close-by partner, otherwise the distance-bound would be broken.
To easily specify protocols using atomic exchanges, the (challenge, A, B, m) query by A it simply denoted "atomic: m". It is followed by the message answering M(m) by B, due to an abuse of notation. This implicitly means that B must have committed M to F atomic before.
UC-realization of Commitment in the F atomic -hybrid model
It is easy to see that any input-aware equivocable commitment UC-realizes commitment using F 0-isolate : we just have to run S and R in isolation. Here, we strengthen the result by relying on F atomic only. The Π Gen protocol, presented in Fig. 1 also requires some messages to be exchanged atomically, i.e., using the F atomic functionality. This means that if R wants S to compute X, X on his own based upon S's view and the fresh receipt of X 0 , then they establish an atomic exchange: S cooperates in this and sends (several) (atomic, R, S, algo_of_S) to F atomic , where algo_of_S computes (X, X ) from the (hard-coded) partial view of S and the input X 0 . We consider only the last deposited algo_of_S. Then, R sends (challenge, R, S, X 0 ) to F atomic , which will eventually send X 0 to S and X, X to R, with (X, X ) := algo_of_S(X 0 ) with algo_of_S running up to poly(|X 0 |) in time. The same goes for the Y 0 → (Y,Y ) atomic exchange.
We are now going to prove that the Π Gen protocol UC-realizes commitment.
Theorem 10. Under the ag-CDH 1 Gen , DDH Gen , and ag-DHK0 Gen assumptions, in the F atomic -hybrid UC model in the presence of static, non-adaptive adversaries, the protocol Π Gen UC-realizes F COM .
The proof is very similar to the one of Th. 9. We construct an ideal adversary I by using the straight-line extraction of b (when the sender is corrupted) or the straight-line equivocation (when the receiver is corrupted). In the first case, we use the extracted b to commit to it. In the latter case, I simulates the commitment to a dummy bit b to R * COM , then we use the equivocation once b is opened by the functionality to simulate the opening to b .
We note that the constructed I does not require rewinding. However, to prove that I works well, we do rewind algorithms, but this is allowed. The (sketch of) proof is given in Appendix B.
Discussions about the UC-realization of F COM by Π Gen . We underline that, as per Fig. 1 , after the initialization phase, the two parties involved are in the position where they share (amongst other things) the tuple (X,Y ). This part can be separated and viewed realizing itself a particular key-sharing functionality (call it G) in a F atomic -hybrid UC model. Then, the UC-realization in Th. 10 can be cast as follows: "in the G-hybrid UC model in the presence of static, non-adaptive adversaries, the protocol Π Gen (i.e., Π Gen without its init phase exchanging X and Y ) UC-realizes F COM (if the ag-DHK0 Gen assumption, the ag-DDH Gen and the ag-CDH 1 Gen assumption hold)." The formulation above renders our result visibly closer to the result in [15] . Namely, if a setup functionality restricting the communication is available, then this leads to some key-establishment, which then leads to the UC-realization of commitment. However, the difference between our approach here and the one in [15] is that secret extraction is integrated based on input-awareness, and we do not need to run a multi-round protocol in isolation: only an elementary challengeresponse one. Finally, this indicates that cryptography becomes UC-realizable in a natural way when participants are able to have "close encounters" to exchange public-key material.
ZK is UC-realized in the F COM -hybrid model [10] by mainstream ideas: by repeating t times, in parallel, Blum's protocol for Hamiltonian-Cycles (HC) [4] , where the commitments of the provers are calls to F COM . Thus, our one-time one-bit-commitment can be used to UC realize ZK in the same complexity as the Canetti's et al.
F HCOM [16] , for homomorphic commitment. This functionality is slightly different from the original F MCOM ; there the difference stems from the increased efficiency sought and, most importantly, from the way to achieve equivocability and extractability for the ideal adversary I . In the introduction, we recalled the so-called UC-"mixed commitments" [16] by Damgård and Nielsen, which achieve their equivocability and extractability for the ideal adversary I by basing their commitment on two, disjoint sets of keys: the E-keys (for the perfectly hiding property and equivocability by I ), and on the X-keys (for the perfectly binding property and extractability by I ). For the simulation to work, only a part of the key (formed of E-keys [16] , used for the perfectly hiding property and equivocability by I ) is placed in the reference string. The Damgård and Nielsen commitments are inherently based on non-erasure Σ-protocols and their security against lunchtime opening [16] , i.e., roughly, an adversary is unable to produce an arbitrary opening for a commitment, even if he sees several fake commitments under E-keys and can adaptively specify how these ones should be opened. One such commitment protocol is based on the p-subgroup assumption [29] and another assumes hardness of the decisional composite residuosity problem [30] used in Paillier's cryptosystem. We believe that our construction can be extended also exploiting the Paillier encryption, to commit to more than one bit. Damgård and Nielsen [16] construct ZK efficiently using their commitments on top of the SAT protocol which proves satisfiability of boolean circuits.
Using our approach, we can further realize a PKI in a natural way. What we need is to establish a link between each participant and a central authority, then UC-realize key registration based on commitment using standard proof-ofknowledge techniques. Based on the PKI, we can realize multiparty computation. Our technique also makes it easier to realize 2-party computation is a light way.
Conclusions
In this paper, we formalized two special kinds of Diffie-Hellman assumptions, formalized an input-aware equivocable scheme and exhibits a protocol Π Gen that provably implements the scheme under the aforementioned assumptions. These objects and proofs have been done along traditional lines, i.e., outside of a particular framework like Canetti's UC model.
We presented a UC (setup) functionality called F atomic (which allows two parties to have a short, "fully isolated" exchange of just one message each). We gave the necessary proofs to show that a slight modification of our protocol Π Gen UC-realizes commitments. This is possible without the need of a PKI, i.e., with the mere separation of an initialization phase (using just 2 atomic exchanges) and allows the two parties involved to establish two private, public key-pairs.
Finally, we also herein discussed the relevance and efficiency of our protocol, on a stand-alone basis as well as a protocol realizing other primitives, e.g., ZK. 16 standard lines, i.e., outside the UC framework. Thus, we sometimes refer to them as IAC (input-aware commitments) as opposed to IAEC (input-aware equivocable commitments). Canetti et al. [9] applied known commitment-constructions from injective one-way functions and from pseudorandom generators to get extractable commitments (i.e., IAC) when the underlying primitives used are extractable. We dissociate ourselves from this method and rely instead on hardness assumptions 6 .
In the above sense, we use a stronger knowledge guarantee, which brings us closer to an (unpublished) result by Ventre and Visconti [32] in which they construct extractable commitments (i.e., IAC) from plaintext-aware encryption schemes, using certain hardness assumptions. However, our construction is not from PAW encryption directly, yet it bears similar assumptions to such encryption schemes [14] , but it is also equivocable, i.e., it is an IAEC.
Further, we mention that primitives similar to input-aware equivocable commitments have been explored before by Damgård and Nielsen (i.e., mixed commitments) inside the UC framework, UC-realizing an ideal functionality F HCOM of homomorphic commitment [16] in the CRS-hybrid UC model. Here, the formalization is different, the protocol more specific, the scheme is initially cast upon traditional lines. We only eventually show that we UC-realize the normal, ideal functionality of commitment, i.e., not the homomorphic version, using not a CRS, but a different setup. Namely, we show that our specialized commitment protocol is UC-realizable in the UC hybrid model with the F atomic setup. More precisely, we will show that the thus-wise realized protocol UC-emulates the ideal functionality of commitment F COM (not F HCOM ). The protocol from Damgård and Nielsen [16] is sometimes extractable, sometimes equivocable, but not both. This depends on what the simulator needs in UC-security. (See more technical details on page 16.) In the plain model, Damgård and Nielsen's commitment is therefore not extractable nor equivocable. This is essentially different from the protocol advanced herein. Indeed, one of the ideas in this paper also lies in introducing new techniques of extractability of the "real" committed bit by the ideal adversary. Our protocol enjoys both extractability and equivocability, at the same time, even outside of the UC framework.
When compared to constructions from Damgård et al. [15] , one advantage of our input-aware equivocable commitment is that it integrates the secret key extraction and becomes feasible with F atomic efficiently. (In [15] , the entire prover protocol of a WI -PoK scheme must be run in isolation.)
Another notion to thwart relay attack in commitment protocols is the notion of mutually independent commitments [24] .
B Proof of Th. 10
Proof (sketch). Given a real-world adversary A in the UC model with atomicexchange setup, we construct a UC ideal adversary I as follows.
A. We first treat the case where only S is corrupted by A and it is denoted as S * . I simulates S * , F atomic and R COM internally, and I lets S * interact with Z externally (so that Z cannot distinguish I 's run from the real-world experiment).
The simulation by I together with Z defines an algorithm B, which stops before F atomic receives X 0 from R COM (as per the games defining the DDH and DHK0 assumptions). The algorithm B defines ρ and state, the latter being the current view of S * . Like before, in state, we restrict to the coins r A that S * has used so far. Let the unused coins by S * be denoted r A . The next step of the simulation defines from state the last algorithm that S * would have sent to F atomic such that A(state,X 0 ; r A ) would produce (X, X ), using solely on the view of A since in fact X, X should be the output m of F atomic . By the assumptions we use, we now have another algorithm E(state,X 0 ; r A ) that yields x such that X = g x or R COM aborts 7 . Thus, our constructed I can simply run E(state,X 0 ; r A ) by using the view of S * . As I goes on in the simulation of R COM , it can extract the committed bit b from (U,V ) thanks to x and send this bit to F COM . As in Th. 9, we can show that the opening to 1 − b would contradict the assumptions.
B. When R is corrupted by A, we denote it as R * . The simulation works as follows. I simulates R * , F atomic and S COM (b 0 ) (for an arbitrary bit b 0 ) internally, and I lets R * interact with Z externally (so that Z cannot distinguish I 's run from the real-world experiment).
The simulation by I together with Z defines an algorithm B, which runs until the moment before F atomic receives Y 0 from S COM and then B stops. As before, B will produce ρ and state as the current view of R * , limiting his coins r A to r A , i.e., to those used so far, where r A := r A ||r A . Then the output (Y,Y ) of F atomic (on the algorithm sent to it by R * ) can be seen as the output of A with input state. Augmented with the message Y 0 and the coins r A , it defines A(state,Y 0 ; r A ). Due to the ag-DHK0 Gen assumption, there must exist some algorithm E such that, except for negligible cases, E(state,Y 0 ; r A ) produces y satisfying Y = g y , or S COM rejects (Y,Y ). Note that as before, the pair (Y,Y ) is produced by using solely on the view of R * (since the message Y 0 is tagged as atomic). So, our constructed I can again simply run E(state,Y 0 ; r A ). Then, the adversary I can either simulate S OPEN (if b=b 0 ) or, otherwise, simulate Equiv using y.
The argument of the indistinguishability between the two worlds (the real one and the simulated one by I ) follows the exact same arguments as those in the proof of Th. 9.
7 If M aborts in real life, we assume it outputs a special value such that the protocol itself finishes.
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